This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. We …nd that the development of hub-and-spoke (HS) networks may have detrimental e¤ects on social welfare in presence of airport congestion. The theoretical analysis shows that, although airline pro…ts are typically higher under HS networks, congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt fully-connected (FC) networks. However, the welfare analysis leads to the conclusion that airlines may have an ine¢ cient bias towards HS networks. In line with the theoretical analysis, our empirical results show that network airlines are weakly in ‡uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies from/to their hub airports. Consistently with this result, we con…rm that delays are higher in hub airports controlling for concentration and airport size.
With the deregulation of the US air transportation sector, carriers became free to make strategic choices concerning fares and network structure. The success of hub-and-spoke (HS) structures in the years following the deregulation, which led to a concentration of tra¢ c on the spoke routes, is explained by the savings from operating fewer routes and the exploitation of economies of tra¢ c density from using larger aircraft. However, the concentration of tra¢ c favored by HS networks has contributed to an increase in airport congestion. In congested hubs, a high proportion of ‡ights are a¤ected by delays, cancellations and missed connections that end up a¤ecting both air travelers and airlines.
Therefore, congestion is a major concern and a relevant policy issue. A particularity of the US market is that airport slot constraints are not widely used, 1 while this is the norm in many European large airports. Other measures addressed to overcome the problem of congestion are di¢ cult to implement: investing in capacities is very expensive and congestion pricing is complex to put into practice.
Di¤erently to network airlines (which operate HS networks), low-cost carriers operate fully-connected (FC) networks where most air services are point-to-point. The proportion of delayed ‡ights in large US concentrated airports is substantially lower when the dominant airline is a low-cost carrier (in most cases Southwest). As an example, Table 1 shows data on delays at the main airports of American Airlines and Southwest. 2 Insert here Table 1 Although the share of Southwest may be as high as that of American, the proportion of delayed ‡ights is substantially lower in airports dominated by Southwest. Thus, the analysis of airline network structure is essential to understand the problem of airport congestion.
A more comprehensive preliminary evidence on the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure is found in Fig. 1 , which presents the results of an spline regression that estimates the relationship between the variation of frequencies and delays (in the previous year) using airport-level data, making the distinction between airlines operating in hub airports (i.e., airlines operating HS networks where there is a high proportion of connecting tra¢ c) and airlines o¤ering services in non-hub airports (i.e., airlines operating FC networks where tra¢ c is mostly point-to-point).
Insert here Fig. 1 Airlines reduce frequencies as delays increase in non-hub airports. However, the adjustment of frequencies to higher delays is not clear in hub airports. Thus, this spline regression shows that airlines operating in hub airports are less sensitive to airport congestion in their choice of ‡ight frequencies. 3 This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. We show that the development of HS networks may have detrimental e¤ects on social welfare in presence of airport congestion.
Our theoretical model compares the incentives for airlines to operate either HS or FC networks in presence of congestion. Although airline pro…ts are typically higher under HS networks, congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt FC networks. 4 However, the welfare analysis leads to the conclusion that airlines may have an ine¢ cient bias towards HS networks.
Furthermore, we use data of large US airports for the period 2005-2010 to examine how airlines adjust frequencies to congestion both under HS and FC networks. In line with our theoretical analysis, which predicts and ine¢ cient bias towards HS networks, our empirical results show that network airlines are weakly in ‡uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies from/their hub airports. Consistently with this result, we also …nd that delays are higher in hub airports controlling for concentration and airport size.
Our study brings together two strands of literature on air transportation. First, it is related to the studies on airlines'network choice, which include Brueckner and Zhang Our analysis extends the monopoly case (without congestion) studied in Brueckner (2004) by examining network choice in a duopoly market with schedule competition where airport congestion can occur. 5 Second, it also contributes to the growing literature on airport congestion. The theoretical and empirical studies of airport congestion primarily center around the congestion self-internalization debate. The hypothesis that airlines at concentrated airports may be prone to internalize self-imposed congestion was proposed by Brueckner (2002) . Mayer and Sinai (2003) demonstrate that, even though delays at hub airports are longer than at non-hub gateways, increasing airport concentration does lead to lower delays. 6 Rupp ( The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model and the equilibrium analysis is presented in Section 2. The welfare analysis is undertaken in Section 3, while the empirical analysis is executed in Section 4. A brief conclusion closes the paper.
The model and the equilibrium analysis
In a rather simple setting, this section presents a model to characterize FC and HS networks, analyzes the equilibrium fares and frequencies, and compares the pro…tability of each network structure. This model extends the monopoly case studied in Brueckner (2004) by analyzing network choice in a duopoly market and introducing the presence of congestion.
We assume the simplest possible network with three cities (A, B and H), two airlines (1 and 2), and three city-pair markets (AH, BH and AB). Markets AH and BH are served nonstop and AB can be served either directly (when airlines operate a FC network) or indirectly via hub H (when airlines operate a HS network), as shown in Fig. 2 .
Insert here Fig. 2 Passenger population size in each of the city-pair markets is normalized to unity, and it is assumed that all the passengers undertake travel. Thus, we limit the e¤ect of market power by assuming fully-served markets so that airlines exert no monopoly power over any passenger. 8 Therefore, the exercise of market power only a¤ects the division of a …xed tra¢ c pool between the carriers through their choices of fares and frequencies. 9 
Equilibrium analysis of the FC network
In a FC network, both airlines operate ‡ights between each pair of cities, so that nonstop travel occurs in each city-pair market. Utility for a consumer traveling in any city-pair market is given by c expected schedule delay congestion damage + travel benef it.
Firstly, c is consumption expenditure and equals y p i , where p i is airline i's fare with i = 1; 2, and y denotes income, which is assumed to be uniform across consumers without loss of generality.
Secondly, the expected schedule delay is modeled as in Brueckner (2004) b, equal to the gain from travel; and a, the airline brand-loyalty variable. Without brand loyalty, the airline with the most attractive frequency/fare combination would attract all the passengers in the market. However, in presence of brand loyalty, consumers are presumed to have a preference for a particular carrier, which means that an airline with an inferior frequency/airfare combination can still attract some passengers. This approach is formalized by specifying a utility gain from using airline 1 rather than airline 2, denoted a, and assuming that this gain is uniformly distributed over the range [ =2; =2], so that half the consumers prefer airline 1 (and have a > 0) and half prefer airline 2 (and have a < 0). Therefore, a varies across consumers. Interestingly, is a measure of (exogenous) product di¤erentiation in the sense that a small indicates similar products and thus small gain from using one airline or the other; whereas a big allows for signi…cant utility gains depending on passenger's preferred carrier.
The analysis that follows is just presented for carrier 1, and the corresponding expressions for carrier 2 are derived analogously. The utility of a passenger traveling with carrier 1 is
A passenger loyal to 1 (thus with a > 0) will ‡y with her preferred carrier when y p 1
11 Therefore, there is a minimum required brand-loyalty b a, which depends on fares and frequencies, such that only those passengers with a > b a will undertake air travel with airline 1. Otherwise, passengers will choose airline 2. Then, carrier 1's tra¢ c is given by
1 da where 1= gives the density of a.
Carrying out the integration, we obtain the following expression
and carrier 2's demand function is identical after interchanging subscripts.
Quite interestingly, the demand function is independent of passengers' congestion damage because this term cancels out when comparing utilities. As a consequence, airlines will not take into account the congestion they impose on passengers.
The assumptions on airline costs are the following. Without congestion, as in Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007), a ‡ight's operating cost on a certain route is given by + s 1 , where s 1 stands for carrier 1's aircraft size (i.e., the number of seats), is a …xed cost independent of aircraft size, and is the marginal cost per seat. Under this speci…cation, cost per seat realistically falls with aircraft size, capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies from operating a larger aircraft) that are unequivocal in the airline industry.
Airline's ‡ight frequency (f 1 ), aircraft size (s 1 ) and tra¢ c are all related by the equation
, which says that aircraft size equals airline's total tra¢ c on a route divided by frequency. Therefore, we are assuming that all seats are …lled, so that load factor equals 100%. 12 Note that s 1 is an airline choice variable, which is appropriate given that the demands of airlines ultimately determine the nature of aircraft supplied by manufacturers.
While s 1 is thus endogenous, its value is determined residually once q 1 and f 1 are known. Now consider airline congestion costs. Note that the level of congestion on a route is caused by aircraft movements both at the origin and destination airports. As a consequence, airline's congestion cost on a route is given by (4f 1 + 4f 2 ) with 0, and a ‡ight's operating cost on a route is + s 1 + (4f 1 + 4f 2 ).
Therefore, carrier 1's total cost from operating on a route is
or equivalently
Thus, airline 1's pro…t is 1 = 3 (p 1 q 1 c 1 ), and it can be rewritten using Eq. (3) as
Congestion and …xed cost
indicating that variable costs are independent of the number of ‡ights. The corresponding expression for carrier 2 is identical to Eq. (4) after interchanging subscripts. (4) and maximizing, the …rst-order conditions are
Since carriers are symmetric, the symmetric equilibrium is the natural focus, and this equilibrium is found by setting p 1 = p 2 = p and f 1 = f 2 = f . 14 In this case, from Eq. (5) we obtain
revealing that the airfare equals the marginal cost of a seat ( ) plus a markup that depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation ( =2). As brand di¤erentiation disappears, the fare converges to the marginal cost, recovering the Bertrand-equilibrium outcome.
Plugging Eq. (7) into Eq. (6), we get the following equilibrium condition for ‡ight Fig. 3 , where we observe that the f solution occurs at the intersection between a cubic expression (A (f )) and a quadratic expression (B (f )).
Insert here Fig. 3 Looking at Eq. (8) along with Fig. 3 , it is easy to carry out a comparative-static analysis for all the parameters in the model. An increase in carriers'congestion cost ( ) raises the height of the cubic curve, leading to a decrease in f . The reduction of the equilibrium ‡ight frequency is a natural reaction to more damaging congestion. When the disutility of schedule delay ( ) rises, the intercept of the quadratic expression increases, leading to a higher f . Quite intuitively, carriers respond to a rise in the disutility of schedule delay by increasing ‡ight frequency. An increase in the aircraft …xed cost ( ) leads to a higher f 2 -coe¢ cient and, as a consequence, B (f ) becomes more concave and f decreases. As expected, equilibrium frequency falls when the cost of frequency rises.
Finally, looking at travel volumes, we observe that q 1 = 1=2 so that each airline carries half of the demand in every city-pair market.
Equilibrium analysis of the HS network
The analysis of the HS case is analogous to the base case in Flores-Fillol (2010). The main di¤erence with respect to the FC case is that airlines operate ‡ights on only two routes (AH and BH) since route AB is eliminated. Therefore, passengers traveling between cities A and B must make a connecting trip, changing planes at the hub H.
Since congestion depends on the overall aircraft movements at each airport, we need to distinguish between the spoke airports (A and B) and the hub airport (H). On the one hand, the spoke airports only serve one route that connects with the hub, and thus the number of aircraft movements at these two airports is the sum of both carriers'frequency on the mentioned route, i.e., f 
and, in a similar way, the utility of a connecting passenger traveling with carrier 1 is
where is an extra travel cost term that measures layover time, as in Brueckner (2004).
We assume that both airlines generate the same layover time, which enters as a negative shift factor in the utility of connecting passengers since they dislike waiting.
Therefore, we can compute the demand functions as in the FC case, which are given by
and
where capital letters denote tra¢ c and fares in market AB. Carrier 2's demand functions are identical after interchanging subscripts.
Shifting attention to cost structure, aircraft size is now s
, because we need to take into account airline's total tra¢ c on a route (i.e., local + connecting tra¢ c). Since congestion on a route is caused by aircraft movements both at the hub airport (2f with 0, and a ‡ight's operating cost on a route is
Thus, airline 1's pro…t is
, and it can be rewritten using Eq. (13) as as parametric. After plugging Eqs. (11) and (12) into Eq. (14) and maximizing, the …rst-order conditions are
Looking at the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., setting p 15 Eqs. (15) and (16) yield
The local airfare is as the FC equilibrium fare (see Eq. (7)), and the connecting fare is similar but takes into account the fact that two routes are needed to serve this market.
The same results are obtained in Flores-Fillol (2009 and 2010) in a similar setup.
It is important to note that, while fares p h 1 and P h 1 are set independently, they must satisfy non-arbitrage conditions. These conditions are of two types. The …rst type is written P h 1 > p h 1 and prevents a local passenger from purchasing an interline ticket (i.e., an AB ticket) and then get o¤ at the hub airport. The second type is given by P h 1 < 2p h 1 and ensures that an AB passenger will not be able to travel cheaper by purchasing two separate tickets (on routes AH and BH). The ful…llment of these conditions can be trivially observed from inspection of Eq. (18) .
Plugging the equilibrium values in Eq. (18) into Eq. (17), we get the following equilibrium condition for ‡ight frequency
We have again a cubic expression (A h (f )) and a quadratic expression (B h (f )), and thus the equilibrium frequency f h is generated by a diagram analogous to A (f ) is higher than A h (f ) in the positive quadrant and B (f ) is more concave than B h (f ) (and both of them have the same intercept =2). Therefore, the result in the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1 Flight frequency is higher in the HS network than in the FC network, with Since carriers are symmetric, ‡ight frequency (which di¤ers between FC and HS con…gurations) does not a¤ect the equilibrium airfare in markets AH and BH and, 16 as a consequence, p = p h . More interestingly, airlines charge higher airfares in market AB under HS con…gurations (i.e., P h > p), which is explained by the use of two routes to serve this connecting market.
In equilibrium, the total number of ‡ights operated by an airline under FC networks is given by 3f since three routes are active. Analogously, the total number of ‡ights operated by an airline under HS networks is 2f h .
Assumption 1 We assume that HS operations reduce the total number of ‡ights, i.e., To study airlines'network choice, we need to compare equilibrium pro…ts under both network structures. Computing this pro…t di¤erential is not trivial because there is not an equilibrium closed-form solution for ‡ight frequency under either network con…guration.
However, this comparison can be done recasting the optimization problem as a two-stage problem, where fares are chosen …rst conditional on ‡ight frequency, and ‡ight frequency is then chosen in a second stage. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (4), after simplifying and applying symmetry, we obtain
where the 3 factor in the …rst term of the expression denotes the number of city-pair markets served by the airline; the 3 factor in the second term indicates the number of routes in which the airline operates; and the 24 factor in the third term shows that each of the 3 routes operated by the airline is a¤ected by 8 aircraft movements (i.e., 4 aircraft movements of each airline).
Similarly, substituting Eq. (18) into Eq. (14), after simplifying and applying symmetry, we obtain
where the 3 and the 2 factors in the …rst and the second terms of the expression denote that the airline serves 3 city-pair markets but only 2 routes; and the 12 factor in the third term shows that each of the 2 routes operated by an airline is a¤ected by 6 aircraft movements (i.e., 3 aircraft movements of each airline: 2 at the hub airport and 1 at the spoke airport).
Therefore, the HS-FC pro…t di¤erential = h 1 f h 1 (f ) can be easily computed from Eqs. (20) and (21) and is given by
where the …rst term, which is positive, captures the aircraft …xed cost advantage of HS networks from operating only 2 routes; and the second term, which can be either positive or negative, captures the congestion cost advantage that can favor either network structure.
The following proposition discusses the sign of .
Proposition 2 In absence of congestion (i.e., = = 0), airline pro…ts are higher under HS networks (i.e., > 0). In presence of congestion, airline pro…ts are higher under HS networks (i.e., > 0) when f h 6 2 1=2 f = 1:4f , whereas the sign of the pro…t di¤erential
From Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, we know that f < f h < 3f =2. Although FC networks imply twice the aircraft movements of HS networks, the congestion cost can be higher under HS con…gurations when f h approaches its upper bound. The corollary that follows is directly derived from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Congestion could create incentives for airlines to adopt FC network con…gu-rations.
This result could explain the initial success of HS networks after the deregulation, and how congestion could act as a brake on hubbing strategies. 17 
Social optimum and congestion tolls
Having explained the properties of the equilibrium, we now shift our attention to the welfare analysis where a social planner dictates ‡ight frequency. Then we can derive the congestion tolls that are required to achieve e¢ ciency. Finally, we will compare social welfare under FC and HS structures and we will assess the equilibrium network choice, which is the ultimate purpose of this section.
Welfare analysis of the FC network
Since the fare paid is just a transfer between consumers and airlines, and markets are fully served (i.e., total tra¢ c is …xed), the planner's goal is to minimize costs, which are given
Congestion costs for passengers
Fixed and congestion costs for airlines
and AB) is equal to unity. On the passengers side, the schedule delay cost caused by each airline acquires a factor 3=2, because there are three markets and half of the unitary population in each market is loyal to each airline. The congestion cost for passengers has a factor 12 that accounts for all aircraft movements in the three markets (4 corresponding to each market).
On the airlines side, each carrier bears the …xed cost and the congestion cost of operating three routes (3 f i and 3f i (4f 1 + 4f 2 ) with i = 1; 2), and the seat cost of serving three city-pair markets.
The condition for optimal choice of f 1 is
and, after applying symmetry, we obtain the following social-optimum condition
Eqs. (8) and (25) are easily compared. Note that the social-optimum cubic function is higher than the equilibrium one (i.e., A (f ) < C (f ) for f > 0); and that the f 2 -coe¢ cient in the quadratic function is larger in the social-optimum condition for > 0, as depicted in Fig. 5 . Superscript SO denotes socially-optimal values.
Insert here Fig. 5 Therefore, equilibrium frequencies are excessive compared with the optimum (i.e., f > f SO ). On the other hand, we also observe that the equilibrium aircraft size is ine¢ ciently small (i.e., s < s SO ) since markets are fully served and all seats are …lled (recall that
Interestingly, in absence of congestion (i.e., = = 0) the ine¢ ciency disappears and f = f SO = 2 1=2 and s = s SO = 2
1=2
.
Proposition 3 Under congested FC networks, there is an overprovision of ‡ight frequency and aircraft size is suboptimal. In absence of congestion, both frequency and aircraft size are e¢ cient.
As pointed out in Flores-Fillol (2010), when there is congestion airlines operate too many ‡ights using overly small aircraft, and a socially preferred outcome would require less frequent ‡ights and larger aircraft. In fact, the source of the ine¢ cient choice of ‡ight frequency can be seen by comparing the …rst-order conditions corresponding to the equilibrium analysis and the social-optimum analysis. The marginal social congestion cost from operating an extra ‡ight on each route 4 + 16 f (after imposing symmetry in Eq. (24)); and the marginal congestion costs that are taken into account by airlines are 12 f (after imposing symmetry in Eq. (6)). Therefore, the di¤erence between these two expressions is 4 + 4 f , which captures the part of social congestion costs that are not internalized by each airline. More precisely, 4 f represents the congestion in ‡icted on the other carrier, and 4 is the congestion experienced by all passengers (including the carrier's own passengers) on each of the three routes.
Thus, the per- ‡ight congestion toll that is needed to reach the social optimum is 4 +4 f evaluated at the social optimum, i.e.,
Note that the marginal congestion damage (M CD) from an extra ‡ight on a route is given by 4 + 4 f 1 + 4 f 2 (see Eq. (23)); and thus each carrier is charged a toll equal to the marginal congestion damage evaluated at the social optimum (M CD SO ) after subtracting carrier's own internalized congestion. The ine¢ ciency in ‡ight frequency (and thus in aircraft size) arises because airlines only internalize their own congestion, neglecting the higher operating costs imposed on other airlines as well as the congestion costs imposed on all passengers, including their own.
The fact that airlines fail to internalize the congestion in ‡icted on other carriers is well documented in the literature, 18 and the failure to internalize passenger congestion is a contribution of Flores-Fillol (2010). 19 
Welfare analysis of the HS network
Proceeding in the same way, the cost expression under HS networks is
+ |{z}
Layover time cost
The congestion cost for passengers has now a factor 10 that accounts for all aircraft movements in the three markets (3 corresponding to each local market, and 4 corresponding to market AB), and there is also the layover time cost borne by connecting passengers.
Each carrier bears the …xed cost and the congestion cost of operating two routes (2 f h i
and 2f
h 2 with i = 1; 2). Finally, the seat cost acquires a factor 4 because it incorporates the cost of serving all local passengers on markets AH and BH (who make use of one route) and all connecting passengers (who make use of two routes).
The condition for optimal choice of f
Again, the comparison between the expressions in Eqs. (19) and (29) can be represented by a diagram analogous to the one in Fig. 5 , where we observe that equilibrium frequencies are excessive (i.e., f > f SO ) and aircraft size is ine¢ ciently small (i.e., s < s SO ). 20 As in the previous case, in absence of congestion, the ine¢ ciency disappears and f = f SO = (17)). Therefore, the di¤erence between these two expressions is 10 + 6 f h , which captures the part of social congestion costs that are not internalized by each airline. More precisely, 6 f h represents the congestion in ‡icted on the other carrier on both routes, and 10 is the congestion experienced by all passengers (including the carrier's own passengers).
In this situation, taking into account that there are two routes in the network, the toll per ‡ight will be exactly half of the expression 10 + 6 f evaluated at the social optimum,
i.e.,
given by 5 + 3 f 1 + 3 f 2 (see Eq. (27) 
Network e¢ ciency
From the aforementioned analysis, we conclude that the presence of congestion generates excessive frequency, independently of the network type. When there is congestion, airlines operate too many ‡ights using overly small aircraft (regional jets or even turboprops), and less frequent ‡ights and larger aircraft would be socially preferred.
A …nal exercise is to compare the equilibrium and the socially-optimal network choices.
To carry out this exercise, we need to compute a HS-FC welfare di¤erential = W h W , which is tantamount to computing Eq. (27) Eq. (23) and yields
with k = 3 1=f 1=f h + 4 6f 5f h . The …rst term in k is positive and shows the advantage of HS networks in terms of schedule delay given that it yields a larger ‡ight frequency. However, k also comprises two negative terms, which are cost elements related to HS connecting passengers: an extra seat cost because these passengers make use of two routes (whereas AB passengers just make use of one route under FC networks), and a layover time cost since these passengers change planes at the hub H. Finally, the last term of the expression, which captures the di¤erent impact of HS and FC networks in passengers congestion cost, can be either positive or negative depending on the relative value of f and f h .
With k = 0, the sign of is the same as the sign of and therefore the airlines'preferred network con…guration coincides with the socially optimal choice. However, with k 6 = 0, airlines'network choices may be ine¢ cient. In absence of congestion (i.e., = = 0) then > 0, as pointed out in Proposition 2. In this case, a con ‡ict between private and public interests can only arise when k < 0, meaning that the extra seat and layover time costs If f h 6 6f =5 = 1:2f then 4 6f 5f h > 0 and > 0. 23 In this case, there can be a private-public con ‡ict when k < 0, i.e., in presence of important extra seat and layover time costs associated to HS structures, as compared to the HS advantage in terms of schedule delay and passengers congestion cost, i.e., + > 3 1=f 1=f h + 4 6f 5f h .
When f h 2 (1:2f; 1:4f ] then 4 6f 5f h < 0 and > 0. In this case, there can be a private-public con ‡ict when k < 0, i.e., in presence of important extra seat, layover time, and passengers congestion costs associated to HS structures, as compared to the HS advantage in terms of schedule delay, i.e., + 4 6f 5f h > 3 1=f 1=f h .
The di¤erence between these two cases is found on the e¤ect of passengers'congestion disutility: it is larger under FC networks for f h 6 1:2f , whereas it becomes larger under HS networks as f h exceeds this threshold value because there is an increase in the probability of ‡ight delays, cancellations, and missed connections in the hub airport.
Finally, if f h > 1:4f then 4 6f 5f h < 0 still holds but the sign of is ambiguous.
Thus, airlines network choice may exhibit an ine¢ cient bias either toward the HS network or toward the FC network. In a in a highly congested environment where both airlines'
and passengers'marginal congestion damage ( and ) are large, then < 0 and k < 0, so that there is no private-public con ‡ict and the FC is preferred. However, if airlines'…xed cost ( ) is su¢ ciently high as compared to airlines' congestion damage ( ), then > 0 and k < 0 could be observed, yielding an airlines'ine¢ cient bias toward HS networks. The proposition that follows summarizes these results.
Proposition 5
In absence of congestion, airlines network choice may exhibit an ine¢ cient bias toward the HS network when the extra seat and layover time costs associated to HS structures overcome to the advantage in terms of schedule delay. In presence of congestion, this result is reinforced for f h > 1:2f (requiring a high airline …xed cost when f h > 1:4f ) and it also remains true for f h 6 1:2f when passengers' congestion damage is not very high.
Therefore, airport congestion can yield an ine¢ cient outcome where airlines decide to adopt HS network con…gurations, whereas the optimal social network would recommend a FC structure. This result extends and complements the monopoly result in Brueckner 
An empirical application
The equilibrium analysis in Section 2 shows that airlines may prefer to develop HS networks because of the exploitation of economies of tra¢ c density, even if this comes at the expense of higher congestion costs both for passengers and airlines. The welfare analysis in Section 3 leads to the conclusion that there is an overprovision of ‡ight frequency under HS and FC networks in presence of congestion, and airlines may have an ine¢ cient bias towards HS con…gurations. In this section, we want to examine empirically (i) how airlines adjust frequencies to congestion both under HS and FC networks, and (ii) whether delays are higher in airports dominated by network airlines (i.e., airlines providing services in HS con…gurations). We measure congestion at the airport level. We de…ne the levels of congestion as the percentage of originating ‡ights that have been delayed more than …fteen minutes in a given airport. Data of delays have been obtained from the US Department of Transportation.
25 Table 2 shows some features of the airports included in our sample.
Insert here Table 2 Regarding hub airports, the share of the dominant airline in terms of total airport departures is normally above 60%, except for some cases (New York (JFK), Chicago (ORD), and Phoenix (PHX)) where two airlines have a relatively large share. In the considered period, the percentage of delayed ‡ights in hub airports is well above 20%, and it is close to 30% in the more congested airports (New York (EWR and JFK), Chicago (ORD), and Philadelphia (PHL)). Salt Lake City (SLC) and Phoenix (PHX) are the only hub airports having a percentage of delayed ‡ights slightly below 20%.
A high number of non-hub airports are dominated by Southwest. In some of these airports, the share of Southwest is above 75%, like Dallas (DAL), Houston (HOU), Chicago (MDW), and Oakland (OAK). Thus, the levels of concentration in non-hub airports dominated by Southwest may also be very high. The percentage of delayed ‡ights in Southwestdominated airports is usually above 20%, although it seems that the levels of congestion are generally lower than in hub airports. The non-hub airports where Southwest is not the dominant airline generally show low concentration and congestion levels. However, New York (LGA), which is a slot constrained airport, is also very congested.
The relationship between frequencies and delays
The spline regression displayed in Fig, 1 already shows some preliminary evidence (without any restriction) on the relationship between airport congestion and airline network structure. It suggests that airlines operating in hub airports are less sensitive to airport congestion in their choice of ‡ight frequencies. However, we should distinguish the di¤erent airlines operating at each airport and control for demand to come to a de…nite conclusion.
Thus, we estimate the following equation for the airline i at airport a from urban area u F req i;a;t = 0 + 1 P op 
The dependent variable (F req i;a;t ) is the total number of annual ‡ights that each airline o¤ers in the corresponding airport. Data of the explanatory variables are for the previous year because airline frequencies at the airport level in period t should be in ‡uenced by airport and airline features in period t 1. Among the explanatory variables, we include variables related to local demand: population (P op u;t 1 ), GDP per capita (GDP pc u;t 1 ), and time dummies for each year of the considered period, being 2005 the excluded year.
Data on population and GDP per capita, which has been obtained from the US census, refer to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) where the airport is located.
We can expect a positive sign of the coe¢ cients associated to the population and income variables. Airlines may have incentives to increase the number of ‡ights on routes departing from airports located in areas with a higher local demand. Thus, demand of airline services should be higher in airports located in more populated and richer urban areas. Furthermore, the economic recession shows its …rst e¤ects on demand for air transportation in 2008, although it must be taken into account that airlines schedule frequencies some months in advance. Thus, the year dummies may identify the impact of the economic recession on the demand and, hence, on airline frequencies.
Along with variables related to local demand, we consider a measure of airport congestion (Delays a;t 1 ), which is constructed as the percentage of total ‡ights in the airport with a delay exceeding …fteen minutes. Furthermore, we consider a dummy variable (D hub i;a ) that takes the value one for network airlines operating in their hub airports and zero otherwise. Finally, we include a variable that results from the interaction between the dummy variable for network airlines operating in their hubs and the measure of congestion (D hub i;a xDelays a;t 1 ). Controlling for local demand, frequencies of network airlines in their hub airports (i.e., airlines operating HS networks) should be higher than frequencies of other airlines in those hub airports and than frequencies of any airline operating in non-hub airports (i.e., airlines operating FC networks). The reason is the exploitation of connecting tra¢ c, which is independent from local demand. Thus, we expect a positive sign in the coe¢ cient associated to D hub i;a . The relationship between frequencies and delays is determined by the coe¢ cient associated to the delays variable ( 3 ). Furthermore, the slope of the relationship frequenciesdelays for network airlines operating in their hubs (i.e., airlines operating HS networks) will also be in ‡uenced by the coe¢ cient associated to the interaction variable between delays and the dummy for network airlines at hub airports ( 5 ). Overall, airline frequencies should fall when delays rise because of the costs associated to congestion. Hence, we expect 3 < 0. However, if network airlines at their hubs react less to delays than the rest of airlines, we should expect 5 > 0. This result would be consistent with the theoretical model where we …nd an ine¢ cient bias towards HS networks in presence of congestion.
The estimation is made using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and airport …xed e¤ects (within estimator) for di¤erent subsamples. 26 An advantage of the …xed-e¤ects model is that it allows controlling for any omitted variable, which is correlated with the variables of interest and does not change over time. However, a shortcoming of the …xed e¤ects model is that it may be less informative than other estimation techniques because the within variation of data may be low and time-invariant variables are not identi…ed. This implies that the dummy for hub airports and its interaction with the delays variable, which are two important variables in our analysis, must be excluded from the regression.
The OLS estimation of Eq. (32) is made for the full sample and for a subsample that just considers concentrated airports to take into account the internalization hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, airlines only internalize their own congestion, neglecting the higher operating costs imposed on other airlines as well as the congestion costs imposed on all passengers. Therefore, delays should have a higher impact on frequencies in more concentrated airports (regardless of the network con…guration they operate) because the dominating airline should respond to the congestion costs generated by its own ‡ights.
The estimation of Eq. (32) with airport …xed e¤ects is made for a subsample that considers hub airports and another one that considers non-hub airports. 27 If airlines operating under HS networks react less to congestion than airlines operating FC structures, then the delays variable should have a stronger (negative) in ‡uence on frequencies in the subsample that considers non-hub airports.
Standard errors are robust to heterocedasticity and are clustered by time to account for any problem of serial autocorrelation. Since there could be a simultaneous determination of frequencies and delays, we deal with this potential endogeneity bias by using the …rst lag of the delays variable. Delays at the airport in period t 1 should not be conditioned upon frequencies in period t. Note also that the frequency variable is at the airline-airport level, while the delays variable is at the airport level.
Another econometric issue that must be mentioned is the high correlation between the variables D hub i;a and D hub i;a xDelays a;t 1 , which may pose a multicollinearity problem that could distort the individual identi…cation of these variables. However, additional regressions excluding either of the two variables show that the sign and the statistical signi…cance of both variables is not altered.
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Insert here Table 3 Table 3 depicts some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
From this table, it is clear that congestion is a general problem in the US largest airports since the mean percentage of delayed ‡ights is about 23%. However, there is a wide dispersion across the airports of the sample because the minimum value is 13% and the maximum is about 38%. The rest of variables also show a high enough variability to provide robust estimations. Note that we consider as concentrated those airports having a mean Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) higher than the sample mean, which is 0:33.
The concentration index is measured through the share of airlines in the airports in terms of total departures. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of Eq. (32) for di¤erent subsamples using OLS and airport …xed e¤ects. Table 5 reports the elasticities obtained from the estimated coe¢ cients evaluated at sample means in relation to Delays a;t 1 and D hub i;a . The overall explanatory power of the model is notably high. Furthermore, the elasticities obtained for the main variables are also remarkable.
Insert here Tables 4 and 5
We con…rm that airlines o¤er higher frequencies in airports where the urban area can potentially involve a higher demand for air travel. The coe¢ cient associated to the population variable is always positive, although it is statistically signi…cant only in the OLS regression that considers the full sample.
The GDP per capita variable does not show a statistically-signi…cant positive e¤ect on airline frequencies, while the coe¢ cient associated to the 2010 dummy variable (after the global recession) is always negative and statistically signi…cant.
As expected, the coe¢ cient of the dummy for hub airports is positive and statistically signi…cant in the regressions that can be identi…ed. Hence, network airlines in their hub airports provide more frequencies than the rest of airlines in those hub airports, but also than any airline (even dominant airlines) in non-hub airports. This …nding con…rms the result in Proposition 1 and is explained by the fact that HS network con…gurations are characterized by the exploitation of connecting services and the concentration of tra¢ c on the routes connecting di¤erent endpoints with the hub airport.
Overall, we …nd that airlines operating under HS networks are less in ‡uenced by airport congestion in their choice of frequencies. In the OLS regressions, the coe¢ cient associated with the delays variable is negative and statistically signi…cant both in the full sample and in the sample with concentrated airports. However, the e¤ect of delays on frequencies is mitigated in the case of network airlines operating in their hub airports because the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction between the dummy variable for network airlines operating in their hubs and the measure of congestion is positive and statistically signi…-cant (both in the full sample and in the sample with concentrated airports). In terms of elasticities, a 10 percent increase in airport delays implies a decrease of about 3 percent in airline frequencies. This negative relationship is partially compensated when airlines operate HS networks as the (positive) elasticity obtained from the interaction variable is about 1-3 percent. Furthermore, in the regressions with airport …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ -cient associated with the delays variable is negative and statistically signi…cant for non-hub airports, while it is positive (although not statistically signi…cant) for hub airports. The di¤erences in terms of elasticities are very high.
Shifting attention to concentrated airports (airports with a mean concentration index higher than the sample mean), we …nd weak evidence in favor of the internalization hypothesis. Airlines are slightly more sensitive to delays in concentrated airports because the elasticity obtained from the estimated coe¢ cient of the delays variable (which is always negative) is a little higher. However, the positive elasticity of the interaction variable is particularly high on concentrated airports. Therefore, the results for airlines operating HS networks are not favorable to the internalization hypothesis. In any case, the aim of the analysis is not to provide direct tests on the internalization hypothesis, although we have to take into account the extent to which our results are a¤ected by the levels of concentration at the considered airports. As we have seen in our theoretical model where own congestion is always internalized, congestion is unequivocally worse for passengers and may also be worse for airlines under HS networks (as compared to FC networks).
Therefore, independently of the internalization phenomenon, HS networks may be socially detrimental.
In short, we …nd that airlines operating HS networks are less in ‡uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies. Recall that airlines may exploit network e¤ects under HS networks: higher frequencies enhance demand and a higher demand implies savings in terms of economies of tra¢ c density. Furthermore, they save …xed costs by operating fewer routes than under a FC network, as can be seen from inspection of Eq. (22) .
As pointed out in Flores-Fillol (2010), network size in HS con…gurations may contribute to explain this behavior. On the one hand, by adding a new route to an existing HS network, carriers gain access to one local market and to n connecting markets and, hence, they increase ‡ight frequency. However, on the other hand, there is also an additional aircraft movement at the hub airport that increases congestion, a¤ecting both carriers and passengers. It seems that the …rst e¤ect partially compensates the second one for the airlines in our sample.
Hub airports and delays
Results of regressions of Eq. (32) provide evidence that airlines operating a HS network react less to delays. To examine the consequences of this behavior on passengers, we run an additional regression at the airport level. Controlling for the number of departures and concentration, we want to test whether delays are higher in hub airports. Thus, we estimate the following equation at airport a
The dependent variable is our measure of airport congestion, which is the percentage of total ‡ights in the airport with a delay exceeding …fteen minutes. As explanatory variables, we consider the total number of annual ‡ights in the airport, a dummy variable that takes the value one for hub airports where the dominant airline adopts a HS network, and the Quite naturally, we should expect a positive relationship between frequencies (which are a measure of airport size) and delays. The possible simultaneous determination of delays and frequencies is taken into account by considering one year lag of the frequencies variable.
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As we have mentioned above, the empirical literature on airport congestion has focused on testing the internalization hypothesis. A positive evidence of it would be a negative relationship between delays and the concentration index. As in the case of the frequencies variable, we also consider one year lag of the concentration variable.
Furthermore, we expect a positive relationship between delays and the hub airport variable. For a given level of frequencies and competition at the airport, delays should be higher in hub airports. In line with the previous results, delays should be higher in hub airports because airlines operating under HS are less in ‡uenced by congestion in their choice of frequencies
The estimation is made using OLS. The use of …xed e¤ects implies losing one time invariant variable (i.e., the dummy for hub airports), which makes the rest of explanatory variables statistically non-signi…cant. It seems that the airport …xed e¤ects capture all the relevant relationships in our context. Insert here Table 6 Finally, the hub variable is positive and statistically signi…cant as expected. Controlling for the number of frequencies and concentration, we …nd evidence that delays are higher in airports where airlines are operating under a HS con…guration. From our results, we could also infer that the internalization hypothesis is weaker when we distinguish between hub and non-hub airports. It seems that airlines operating HS networks do not fully internalize congestion even when their share of frequencies in the corresponding hub airport is very high. The explanation is found in the aforementioned network bene…ts that airlines may obtain from operating under HS networks.
Concluding remarks
Network carriers tend to concentrate tra¢ c at few airports. Under HS networks, airlines may exploit network e¤ects: higher frequencies enhance demand and a higher demand implies savings in terms of economies of tra¢ c density. Furthermore they save costs by operating fewer routes than under a FC network. This concentration of tra¢ c exacerbates congestion problems, which cause substantial costs for passengers and airlines.
Airport congestion has not been adequately tackled from a public policy perspective.
This may be explained by di¤erent factors such as the di¢ culties in implementing congestion pricing or the high investments costs associated to airport expansions. As a consequence, congestion still remains a severe problem in the air transportation industry, which becomes especially serious in the US where only four airports are slot-constrained. 3 An advantage of the spline regression is that it does not impose any restriction or shape in the functional form of the considered relationship. However, we should distinguish the di¤erent airlines operating at each airport and control for demand to come to a de…nite conclusion. 4 In a di¤erent setting without congestion, Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2012a and 2012b) study the surge of new point-to-point connections in thin markets, which seems to be related to the success of two major innovations in the provision of air services: the regional jet technology and the low-cost business model. 5 Other studies of frequency choice and scheduling competition include works by Brueckner (2004) welfare e¤ects of traditional congestion tolls and the optimal congestion that would take into account the internalization, …nding that there are not substantial gains from applying the optimal congestion tolls. 8 We follow the approach in Flores-Fillol (2010). Partially-served markets introduce tractability complications derived from the presence of market power. In such a case, it is di¢ cult to have unambiguous e¤ects because a reduction in a carrier's ‡ight volume mitigates airport congestion but raises fares (through a standard market-power e¤ect). As a result, airline choices involve both the exploitation of market power and the desire to limit congestion. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity and to have clear results, we rule out market power by assuming fully-served markets. 9 In a related model without congestion and network structure, Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) allow for partially-served markets by considering the possibility of having low-type passengers, who are characterized by a low valuation of travel and may not undertake air travel. In a di¤erent setting without congestion, Flores-Fillol (2009) compares FC and HS networks allowing for partially-served markets, and …nds that HS networks arise when costs are su¢ ciently low, and that ‡ight frequency can become excessive under HS con…gurations. 10 Therefore consumers compare fares (p 1 and p 2 ) and expected schedule delay ( =f 1 and =f 2 ) of both airlines. While this approach may not be fully accurate for individual consumers, it appears to capture the choice setting of a corporate travel department, which must sign an exclusive contract with a particular airline for transporting its employees. The travel department cares about the average schedule delay for the company employees, while also seeking low fares. It signs an exclusive contract with the airline providing the best combination of these features. Alternatively, the model could apply to individual business travelers, who cannot predict their travel times and thus purchase refundable full-fare tickets, which allow them to board the next ‡ight upon arriving at the airport. In either case, the precise departure times of individual ‡ights are not relevant, accounting for the simplicity of the overall approach. 11 Analogously, the utility of a passenger traveling with carrier 2 is u 2 = y p 2 f2 (4f 1 + 4f 2 )+b a, with a < 0 for passengers loyal to carrier 2 and a > 0 for passengers loyal to carrier 1. 12 As in Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2012a), the 100% load factor assumption could be relaxed by considering l 1 s 1 = q 1 =f 1 , where l 1 2 [0; 1] stands for load factor; and l 1 s 1 is interpreted as the number of passengers per ‡ight, which depends both on the load factor and the aircraft size. However, this distinction is not needed for the purposes of this analysis and therefore we do not include it to keep the setting as simple as possible. In any case, high load factors are a prerequisite for pro…table operations, and the industry average load factor is around 75% (data from IATA, see www.iata.org). 13 As suggested before, when maximizing pro…ts, carriers do not take into account the congestion in ‡icted on passengers since demand functions are independent of passengers'congestion damage. 14 The second-order conditions @ i.e., the margins in each of the markets operated by an airline have to be su¢ ciently large. 15 The second-order conditions @ 2 h
2 < 0 are satis…ed by inspection. The remaining positivity condition on the Hessian determinant, which is assumed to hold, requires
, i.e., the sum of margins in the three markets operated by an airline has to be su¢ ciently large. 16 Note that the …rst-order condition for p 1 is the same both under FC and under HS. 19 Therefore, the rule pointed out in Brueckner and Van Dender (2008) suggesting that each airline is charged M CD SO times its airport ‡ight share (which equals 1=2 in the symmetric equilibrium) does not apply to our setting because airlines are also charged by the congestion imposed on all passengers.
Levying atomistic tolls would imply charging M CD SO to each airline since these kind of tolls ignore carriers'own-congestion internalization. 20 Recall that, under HS con…gurations, s 1 = (q 1 + Q 1 ) =f 1 because both local and connecting passengers travel on routes AH and BH. 21 It is easy to observe that, in absence of congestion, f h > f and s h > s. 22 By comparing Eqs. (25) and (29), we can easily observe that f hSO > f SO , but both 3f hSO > 4f SO and 3f hSO < 4f SO are possible. 23 Proposition 2 shows that f h 6 1:4f is a su¢ cient condition ensuring > 0, whereas the sign of is ambiguous for f h > 1:4f . 24 This is a simpli…cation because all airlines may o¤er connecting services in any airport when their frequencies are su¢ ciently high. However, we think this is sensible assumption given that the bulk of HS operations in the US domestic market are network airlines'services connecting their hub airports. 25 There are previous empirical literature on the determinants of delays ( . 27 The Chow test shows the existence of a structural break between these two subsamples. 28 The results of these additional regressions are available upon request from the authors. 29 Previous papers examining the determinants of delays use data at the ‡ight level, ignoring airport size (with the exception of Brueckner, 2002) . However, the disaggregated analysis has some advantages because it allows analyzing the airlines behavior at a very detailed level, and some technical re…nements like the inclusion of airport …xed e¤ects can be considered. 10% (*).
